《維摩詰經》的倫理學型態是結果主義嗎？－基於「慈悲」與「無我」的批判反思

This essay takes a critical look at the ethical system of the Vimalakīrti Nirdeśa Sūtra through analyzing the concepts of 'compassion' and 'non-self'. I take as my main line of inquiry Charles Goodman's argument that the bodhisattva conduct of Vimalakīrti is a type of consequentialism, aiming not only to establish the validity of his arguments against the original standpoint of the Vimalakīrti Nirdeśa Sūtra, but furthermore also using the text as a core reference to explore types of Buddhist ethics based on the two theories of 'compassion' and 'non-self'. However, despite appearing quite convincing initially, Goodman's argument is inherently flawed: having taken into account the implications of 'non-self', 'non-abiding' and 'compassion' during the decision procedure of the consequentialist, he however neglects the implications of 'non-self' and 'non-abiding' during the structure of evaluation of consequentialism as a whole in his appraisal of the ethical system of the Vimalakīrti Nirdeśa Sūtra, thus resulting in a conflict between the outcome of his argument and his initial definition. I argue that the core standpoint of the Vimalakīrti Nirdeśa Sūtra is irreconcilable with a consequentialist ethical system, and further point out that since the theories of 'non-self ' and 'compassion' are based on the realization of emptiness, the core implications of the Vimalakīrti Nirdeśa Sūtra which relies on concepts such as 'non-self', 'compassion', 'non-abiding', 'emptiness', 'non-duality' and so forth can be taken as an authoritative persuasion of its distinctive ethical system under the guise of 'neither exhaust the conditioned, nor abide in the unconditioned' as put forward in the Vimalakīrti Nirdeśa Sūtra.