Abstract
In this paper, we discuss a EOQ model on Stackelberg game in supply chain, that is, a distribution channel system contains one supplier and a single retailer, and the supplier in the channel holds monopolistic status, in which he not only owns cost information about the retailer but also has the decision-making right of the lead time. Under this circumstance, the optimal lead time and order cycle time of the supplier and the retailer, respectively, are investigated, and approximate solutions for then are derived. The analysis is made by numerical data that it's likely to bring the supplier and the retailer profits and losses by controlling the lead time.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 917-921 |
| Number of pages | 5 |
| Journal | International Journal of Advanced Manufacturing Technology |
| Volume | 26 |
| Issue number | 7-8 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2005 Oct 1 |
Fingerprint
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Control and Systems Engineering
- Software
- Mechanical Engineering
- Computer Science Applications
- Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering
Cite this
}
A buyer-vendor EOQ model with changeable lead-time in supply chain. / Hsiao, J. M.; Lin, Chinho.
In: International Journal of Advanced Manufacturing Technology, Vol. 26, No. 7-8, 01.10.2005, p. 917-921.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
TY - JOUR
T1 - A buyer-vendor EOQ model with changeable lead-time in supply chain
AU - Hsiao, J. M.
AU - Lin, Chinho
PY - 2005/10/1
Y1 - 2005/10/1
N2 - In this paper, we discuss a EOQ model on Stackelberg game in supply chain, that is, a distribution channel system contains one supplier and a single retailer, and the supplier in the channel holds monopolistic status, in which he not only owns cost information about the retailer but also has the decision-making right of the lead time. Under this circumstance, the optimal lead time and order cycle time of the supplier and the retailer, respectively, are investigated, and approximate solutions for then are derived. The analysis is made by numerical data that it's likely to bring the supplier and the retailer profits and losses by controlling the lead time.
AB - In this paper, we discuss a EOQ model on Stackelberg game in supply chain, that is, a distribution channel system contains one supplier and a single retailer, and the supplier in the channel holds monopolistic status, in which he not only owns cost information about the retailer but also has the decision-making right of the lead time. Under this circumstance, the optimal lead time and order cycle time of the supplier and the retailer, respectively, are investigated, and approximate solutions for then are derived. The analysis is made by numerical data that it's likely to bring the supplier and the retailer profits and losses by controlling the lead time.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=26644457919&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=26644457919&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/s00170-004-2063-1
DO - 10.1007/s00170-004-2063-1
M3 - Article
VL - 26
SP - 917
EP - 921
JO - International Journal of Advanced Manufacturing Technology
JF - International Journal of Advanced Manufacturing Technology
SN - 0268-3768
IS - 7-8
ER -