A non-cooperative interpretation of the f-just rules of bankruptcy problems

Chih Chang; Cheng Cheng Hu

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2007.10.005

A non-cooperative interpretation of the f-just rules of bankruptcy problems

Chih Chang
, Cheng Cheng Hu

Department of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

15 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

First, we propose an axiomatic characterization of the f-just rules. Second, based on the result, a game is designed and a non-cooperative interpretation of the f-just rules is provided.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	133-144
Number of pages	12
Journal	Games and Economic Behavior
Volume	63
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.10.005
Publication status	Published - 2008 May 1

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Economics and Econometrics
Finance

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10.1016/j.geb.2007.10.005

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A non-cooperative interpretation of the f-just rules of bankruptcy problems

Abstract

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

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