A non-cooperative interpretation of the kernel

Chih Chang, Cheng Cheng Hu

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

5 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The purpose of the paper is to propose a bargaining game to interpret the kernel non-cooperatively. Based on the idea of the Davis-Maschler reduced game, a bilateral bargaining procedure is provided in our game model. We show that the set of all subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of our non-cooperative game coincides with the kernel for transferable utility games.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)185-204
Number of pages20
JournalInternational Journal of Game Theory
Volume46
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2017 Mar 1

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Statistics and Probability
  • Mathematics (miscellaneous)
  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

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