A noncooperative approach to the Mas-Colell bargaining set

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

We propose an extensive form game to give a noncooperative interpretation of the Mas-Colell bargaining set for transferable utility games. Based on the objection and counterobjection in the sense of the Mas-Colell bargaining set, a bilateral negotiation is designed in our model. We show that the equilibrium outcomes of our extensive form game coincide with the Mas-Colell bargaining set in the supperadditive environments.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)884-892
Number of pages9
JournalJournal of Mathematical Economics
Volume46
Issue number5
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2010 Sep 20

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Bargaining
Game
Bargaining set
Form
Extensive form games
Model

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Applied Mathematics

Cite this

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abstract = "We propose an extensive form game to give a noncooperative interpretation of the Mas-Colell bargaining set for transferable utility games. Based on the objection and counterobjection in the sense of the Mas-Colell bargaining set, a bilateral negotiation is designed in our model. We show that the equilibrium outcomes of our extensive form game coincide with the Mas-Colell bargaining set in the supperadditive environments.",
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A noncooperative approach to the Mas-Colell bargaining set. / Hu, Cheng-Cheng.

In: Journal of Mathematical Economics, Vol. 46, No. 5, 20.09.2010, p. 884-892.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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