A noncooperative approach to the Mas-Colell bargaining set

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We propose an extensive form game to give a noncooperative interpretation of the Mas-Colell bargaining set for transferable utility games. Based on the objection and counterobjection in the sense of the Mas-Colell bargaining set, a bilateral negotiation is designed in our model. We show that the equilibrium outcomes of our extensive form game coincide with the Mas-Colell bargaining set in the supperadditive environments.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)884-892
Number of pages9
JournalJournal of Mathematical Economics
Issue number5
Publication statusPublished - 2010 Sep 20

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Applied Mathematics

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