A noncooperative interpretation of the Aumann-Davis-Maschler bargaining set

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2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

An extensive form game is proposed in the paper to give a noncooperative interpretation of the Aumann-Davis-Maschler bargaining set for transferable utility games. Inspired by Stearns' transfer scheme procedure, a bilateral negotiation between the objector and counterobjector is devised in the extensive form game.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)203-217
Number of pages15
JournalMathematical social sciences
Volume54
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2007 Dec 1

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Sociology and Political Science
  • Social Sciences(all)
  • Psychology(all)
  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

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