Abstract
An extensive form game is proposed in the paper to give a noncooperative interpretation of the Aumann-Davis-Maschler bargaining set for transferable utility games. Inspired by Stearns' transfer scheme procedure, a bilateral negotiation between the objector and counterobjector is devised in the extensive form game.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 203-217 |
| Number of pages | 15 |
| Journal | Mathematical social sciences |
| Volume | 54 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2007 Dec |
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Sociology and Political Science
- General Social Sciences
- General Psychology
- Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty
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