Abstract
This study investigates the dynamics between price and lead time for an e-retailing system in which one of its commodities is offered by two duopolistic suppliers. A Stackelberg game is formulated by considering the two suppliers as the leaders and the e-retailer as the follower. The proposed model assists the channel members in getting an equilibrium relationship in a competitive environment. The results suggest that when a supplier chooses a shorter lead time as the competitive strategy, the other supplier should choose a lower price for counteraction, and channel members should understand the characteristics of demand before promoting their commodities.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 71-84 |
| Number of pages | 14 |
| Journal | Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review |
| Volume | 59 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2013 Jan 1 |
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All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Business and International Management
- Civil and Structural Engineering
- Transportation
Cite this
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A study on pricing and delivery strategy for e-retailing systems. / Huang, Yeu-Shiang; Chen, Si Hen; Ho, Jyh Wen.
In: Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Vol. 59, 01.01.2013, p. 71-84.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
TY - JOUR
T1 - A study on pricing and delivery strategy for e-retailing systems
AU - Huang, Yeu-Shiang
AU - Chen, Si Hen
AU - Ho, Jyh Wen
PY - 2013/1/1
Y1 - 2013/1/1
N2 - This study investigates the dynamics between price and lead time for an e-retailing system in which one of its commodities is offered by two duopolistic suppliers. A Stackelberg game is formulated by considering the two suppliers as the leaders and the e-retailer as the follower. The proposed model assists the channel members in getting an equilibrium relationship in a competitive environment. The results suggest that when a supplier chooses a shorter lead time as the competitive strategy, the other supplier should choose a lower price for counteraction, and channel members should understand the characteristics of demand before promoting their commodities.
AB - This study investigates the dynamics between price and lead time for an e-retailing system in which one of its commodities is offered by two duopolistic suppliers. A Stackelberg game is formulated by considering the two suppliers as the leaders and the e-retailer as the follower. The proposed model assists the channel members in getting an equilibrium relationship in a competitive environment. The results suggest that when a supplier chooses a shorter lead time as the competitive strategy, the other supplier should choose a lower price for counteraction, and channel members should understand the characteristics of demand before promoting their commodities.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84885193278&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84885193278&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.tre.2013.09.002
DO - 10.1016/j.tre.2013.09.002
M3 - Article
VL - 59
SP - 71
EP - 84
JO - Transportation Research, Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review
JF - Transportation Research, Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review
SN - 1366-5545
ER -