Agency problems in hospitals participating in self-management project under global budget system in Taiwan

Yu Hua Yan, Shuofen Hsu, Chen Wei Yang, Shih-Chieh Fang

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

9 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Objective: The main purposes of this study are to clarify the agency problems in the hospitals participating in self-management project within the context of Global Budgeting Payment System regulated by Taiwan government, and also to provide some suggestions for hospital administrator and health policy maker in reducing the waste of healthcare resources resulting from agency problems. Method: For the purposes above, this study examines the relationships between two agency problems (ex ante moral hazard and ex post moral hazard) aroused among the hospitals and Bureau of National Health Insurance in Taiwan's health care sector. This study empirically tested the theoretical model at organization level. Results: The findings suggest that the hospital's ex ante moral hazards before participating the self-management project do have some influence on its ex post moral hazards after participating the self-management project. Conclusion: This study concludes that the goal conflict between the agents and the principal certainly exist. The principal tries hard to control the expenditure escalation and keep the financial balance, but the agents have to subsist within limited healthcare resources. Therefore, the agency cost would definitely occur due to the conflicts between both parties. According to the results of the research, some suggestions and related management concepts were proposed at the end of the paper. Crown

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)135-143
Number of pages9
JournalHealth Policy
Volume94
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2010 Feb 1

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Budgets
Self Care
Taiwan
Hospital Administrators
Delivery of Health Care
Health Care Sector
National Health Programs
Health Expenditures
Health Policy
Administrative Personnel
Crowns
Theoretical Models
Organizations
Costs and Cost Analysis
Research

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Health Policy

Cite this

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Agency problems in hospitals participating in self-management project under global budget system in Taiwan. / Yan, Yu Hua; Hsu, Shuofen; Yang, Chen Wei; Fang, Shih-Chieh.

In: Health Policy, Vol. 94, No. 2, 01.02.2010, p. 135-143.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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