An axiomatization of the kernel for TU games through reduced game monotonicity and reduced dominance

Theo Driessen, Cheng Cheng Hu

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

In the framework of transferable utility games, we modify the 2-person Davis-Maschler reduced game to ensure non-emptiness (NE) of the imputation set of the adapted 2-person reduced game. Based on the modification, we propose two new axioms: reduced game monotonicity (RGM) and reduced dominance (RD). Using RGM, RD, NE, Covariance under strategic equivalence, Equal treatment property and Pareto optimality, we are able to characterize the kernel.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1-12
Number of pages12
JournalTheory and Decision
Volume74
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2013 Jan 1

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Decision Sciences(all)
  • Developmental and Educational Psychology
  • Arts and Humanities (miscellaneous)
  • Applied Psychology
  • Social Sciences(all)
  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)
  • Computer Science Applications

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'An axiomatization of the kernel for TU games through reduced game monotonicity and reduced dominance'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

  • Cite this