An axiomatization of the kernel for TU games through reduced game monotonicity and reduced dominance

Theo Driessen; Cheng Cheng Hu

doi:10.1007/s11238-012-9344-1

An axiomatization of the kernel for TU games through reduced game monotonicity and reduced dominance

Theo Driessen, Cheng Cheng Hu

Department of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

In the framework of transferable utility games, we modify the 2-person Davis-Maschler reduced game to ensure non-emptiness (NE) of the imputation set of the adapted 2-person reduced game. Based on the modification, we propose two new axioms: reduced game monotonicity (RGM) and reduced dominance (RD). Using RGM, RD, NE, Covariance under strategic equivalence, Equal treatment property and Pareto optimality, we are able to characterize the kernel.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	1-12
Number of pages	12
Journal	Theory and Decision
Volume	74
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-012-9344-1
Publication status	Published - 2013 Jan

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Decision Sciences(all)
Developmental and Educational Psychology
Arts and Humanities (miscellaneous)
Applied Psychology
Social Sciences(all)
Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)
Computer Science Applications

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10.1007/s11238-012-9344-1

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abstract = "In the framework of transferable utility games, we modify the 2-person Davis-Maschler reduced game to ensure non-emptiness (NE) of the imputation set of the adapted 2-person reduced game. Based on the modification, we propose two new axioms: reduced game monotonicity (RGM) and reduced dominance (RD). Using RGM, RD, NE, Covariance under strategic equivalence, Equal treatment property and Pareto optimality, we are able to characterize the kernel.",

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An axiomatization of the kernel for TU games through reduced game monotonicity and reduced dominance

Abstract

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