An axiomatization of the kernel for TU games through reduced game monotonicity and reduced dominance

Theo Driessen, Cheng-Cheng Hu

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

In the framework of transferable utility games, we modify the 2-person Davis-Maschler reduced game to ensure non-emptiness (NE) of the imputation set of the adapted 2-person reduced game. Based on the modification, we propose two new axioms: reduced game monotonicity (RGM) and reduced dominance (RD). Using RGM, RD, NE, Covariance under strategic equivalence, Equal treatment property and Pareto optimality, we are able to characterize the kernel.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1-12
Number of pages12
JournalTheory and Decision
Volume74
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2013 Jan 1

Fingerprint

axiomatization
equal treatment
human being
equivalence
Axiomatization
Kernel
Monotonicity
Reduced game
TU game

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Decision Sciences(all)
  • Developmental and Educational Psychology
  • Arts and Humanities (miscellaneous)
  • Applied Psychology
  • Social Sciences(all)
  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)
  • Computer Science Applications

Cite this

@article{697a9fe4f6134319a1fa985f403f095e,
title = "An axiomatization of the kernel for TU games through reduced game monotonicity and reduced dominance",
abstract = "In the framework of transferable utility games, we modify the 2-person Davis-Maschler reduced game to ensure non-emptiness (NE) of the imputation set of the adapted 2-person reduced game. Based on the modification, we propose two new axioms: reduced game monotonicity (RGM) and reduced dominance (RD). Using RGM, RD, NE, Covariance under strategic equivalence, Equal treatment property and Pareto optimality, we are able to characterize the kernel.",
author = "Theo Driessen and Cheng-Cheng Hu",
year = "2013",
month = "1",
day = "1",
doi = "10.1007/s11238-012-9344-1",
language = "English",
volume = "74",
pages = "1--12",
journal = "Theory and Decision",
issn = "0040-5833",
publisher = "Springer Netherlands",
number = "1",

}

An axiomatization of the kernel for TU games through reduced game monotonicity and reduced dominance. / Driessen, Theo; Hu, Cheng-Cheng.

In: Theory and Decision, Vol. 74, No. 1, 01.01.2013, p. 1-12.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

TY - JOUR

T1 - An axiomatization of the kernel for TU games through reduced game monotonicity and reduced dominance

AU - Driessen, Theo

AU - Hu, Cheng-Cheng

PY - 2013/1/1

Y1 - 2013/1/1

N2 - In the framework of transferable utility games, we modify the 2-person Davis-Maschler reduced game to ensure non-emptiness (NE) of the imputation set of the adapted 2-person reduced game. Based on the modification, we propose two new axioms: reduced game monotonicity (RGM) and reduced dominance (RD). Using RGM, RD, NE, Covariance under strategic equivalence, Equal treatment property and Pareto optimality, we are able to characterize the kernel.

AB - In the framework of transferable utility games, we modify the 2-person Davis-Maschler reduced game to ensure non-emptiness (NE) of the imputation set of the adapted 2-person reduced game. Based on the modification, we propose two new axioms: reduced game monotonicity (RGM) and reduced dominance (RD). Using RGM, RD, NE, Covariance under strategic equivalence, Equal treatment property and Pareto optimality, we are able to characterize the kernel.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84872604145&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84872604145&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1007/s11238-012-9344-1

DO - 10.1007/s11238-012-9344-1

M3 - Article

VL - 74

SP - 1

EP - 12

JO - Theory and Decision

JF - Theory and Decision

SN - 0040-5833

IS - 1

ER -