Audit quality following the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board’s operation

She Chih Chiu, Chin Chen Chien, Hsuan-Chu Lin

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to investigate the extent to which the transition from self-regulation to heteronomy has changed the gap in audit quality between Big Four and non-Big Four auditors. Design/methodology/approach: This study analyzes publicly held companies in the USA between 1999 and 2012 using univariate analysis, multivariate analysis and quantile regression analysis. Audit quality is measured with discretionary accruals. Findings: This study shows an insignificant difference in audit quality between the clients of Big Four and non-Big Four auditors after Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (hereafter, PCAOB) began its operations. In the analysis of the effects of PCAOB inspections on the audit quality of audit firms that are inspected annually and triennially, the findings show that the inspections have more positive effects when carried out annually. This suggests that the frequency of inspection is positively associated with audit quality. Overall, these results provide evidence that recent improvements in audit quality have been caused by changes in regulatory standards. Originality/value: The paper provides three major original contributions. First, the authors add to the literature on audit quality by further demonstrating a reduced gap in audit quality between Big Four and non-Big Four audit firms due to heteronomy. Secondly, this study contributes to the debate as to whether independent inspections on audit firms are beneficial or not and suggests that the PCAOB inspections help increase audit quality. Finally, the results of this work contribute to the growing literature examining discretionary accruals.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)927-946
Number of pages20
JournalCorporate Governance (Bingley)
Volume17
Issue number5
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2017 Jan 1

Fingerprint

Oversight
Audit quality
Inspection
PCAOB
Audit firms
Discretionary accruals
Auditors
Design methodology
Quantile regression
Regression analysis
Multivariate analysis
Self-regulation

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Business, Management and Accounting (miscellaneous)

Cite this

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Audit quality following the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board’s operation. / Chiu, She Chih; Chien, Chin Chen; Lin, Hsuan-Chu.

In: Corporate Governance (Bingley), Vol. 17, No. 5, 01.01.2017, p. 927-946.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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