TY - JOUR
T1 - Blind False Data Injection Attack Using PCA Approximation Method in Smart Grid
AU - Yu, Zong Han
AU - Chin, Wen Long
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2010-2012 IEEE.
PY - 2015/5/1
Y1 - 2015/5/1
N2 - Accurate state estimation is of paramount importance to maintain normal operations of smart power grids. However, recent research shows that carefully produced attacks with the knowledge of the grid topology, i.e., Jacobian matrix, can bypass the bad data detection (BDD) system. The BDD is used to ensure the integrity of state estimation to filter faulty measurements introduced by device malfunctions or malicious attacks. However, to construct the false data injection attack vectors, a common assumption in most prior works on false data injection attacks is that the attacker has complete knowledge about the power grid topology and transmission-line admittances. By contrast, this paper studies the general problem of blind false data injection attacks using the principal component analysis approximation method without the knowledge of Jacobian matrix and the assumption regarding the distribution of state variables. The proposed attack is proven to be approximately stealthy.1 The performance of the proposed attack is analyzed. Simulations confirm the performance of the proposed method.
AB - Accurate state estimation is of paramount importance to maintain normal operations of smart power grids. However, recent research shows that carefully produced attacks with the knowledge of the grid topology, i.e., Jacobian matrix, can bypass the bad data detection (BDD) system. The BDD is used to ensure the integrity of state estimation to filter faulty measurements introduced by device malfunctions or malicious attacks. However, to construct the false data injection attack vectors, a common assumption in most prior works on false data injection attacks is that the attacker has complete knowledge about the power grid topology and transmission-line admittances. By contrast, this paper studies the general problem of blind false data injection attacks using the principal component analysis approximation method without the knowledge of Jacobian matrix and the assumption regarding the distribution of state variables. The proposed attack is proven to be approximately stealthy.1 The performance of the proposed attack is analyzed. Simulations confirm the performance of the proposed method.
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U2 - 10.1109/TSG.2014.2382714
DO - 10.1109/TSG.2014.2382714
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85027935614
VL - 6
SP - 1219
EP - 1226
JO - IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid
JF - IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid
SN - 1949-3053
IS - 3
M1 - 7001709
ER -