TY - JOUR
T1 - Collaboration and sharing mechanisms in improving corporate social responsibility
AU - Wu, Cheng Han
N1 - Funding Information:
The author thanks the anonymous reviewer for the constructive comments, which have helped to improve the quality of the paper significantly. This research was supported by the National Science Council, Taiwan, R.O.C. under Grant #NSC-101-2410-H-224-003-MY2.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2014, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.
PY - 2016/9/1
Y1 - 2016/9/1
N2 - This paper investigates the effects of the collaboration between an upstream and a downstream firm regarding their decisions of prices and levels of corporate social responsibility (CSR) efforts. The firms collaborate with each other by sharing their costs or benefits to improve their profitabilities and CSR performances. Three collaborative models are developed for considering that collaboration may be undertaken by either or both firms, and each model has both profit- and cost-sharing mechanisms. We derive and characterize the consumer valuation and the firms’ decisions at equilibrium with respect to the changes in the sharing scheme, and further identify the impacts of each sharing mechanism. Moreover, a Nash bargaining game is developed for examining the choices of sharing scheme under the negotiation between the firms. Finally, we provide economic and managerial insights for socially concerned companies.
AB - This paper investigates the effects of the collaboration between an upstream and a downstream firm regarding their decisions of prices and levels of corporate social responsibility (CSR) efforts. The firms collaborate with each other by sharing their costs or benefits to improve their profitabilities and CSR performances. Three collaborative models are developed for considering that collaboration may be undertaken by either or both firms, and each model has both profit- and cost-sharing mechanisms. We derive and characterize the consumer valuation and the firms’ decisions at equilibrium with respect to the changes in the sharing scheme, and further identify the impacts of each sharing mechanism. Moreover, a Nash bargaining game is developed for examining the choices of sharing scheme under the negotiation between the firms. Finally, we provide economic and managerial insights for socially concerned companies.
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/84920517669
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/84920517669#tab=citedBy
U2 - 10.1007/s10100-014-0377-0
DO - 10.1007/s10100-014-0377-0
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84920517669
SN - 1435-246X
VL - 24
SP - 681
EP - 707
JO - Central European Journal of Operations Research
JF - Central European Journal of Operations Research
IS - 3
ER -