Compensation committee characteristics and voluntary executive compensation disclosure

Yu Ling Tsai, Hua Wei Huang

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

Using data from Taiwan listed firms required to voluntarily disclose not only executive but also non-executive compensation adjustments, this study reveals that a higher attendance rate of compensation committee relates to a higher possibility of voluntary disclosure. In addition, our result implies that a higher meeting frequency may represent more arguments among compensation committee members in terms of determining whether or not to make such disclosures. We also find evidence implying that busy members are likely to be ceremonial and unfavourable towards compensation adjustments for non-executive employees, which might have practical implications for policy makers.

Original languageEnglish
JournalApplied Economics Letters
DOIs
Publication statusAccepted/In press - 2020 Jan 1

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics

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