Corporate governance and capital structure dynamics: An empirical study

Li-Kai Liao, Tarun Mukherjee, Wei Wang

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

16 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Consistent with theoretical predictions, we find that both a higher level of financial leverage and a faster speed of adjustment of leverage toward the shareholders' desired level are associated with better corporate governance quality as defined by a more independent board featuring CEO-chairman separation and greater presence of outside directors, coupled with larger institutional shareholding. In contrast, managerial incentive compensation on average discourages use of debt or adjustments toward the shareholders' desired level, consistent with its entrenchment effect. The effect of corporate governance on leverage adjustments is most pronounced when initial leverage is between the manager's desired level and the shareholders' desired level where the interests of managers and shareholders conflict.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)169-192
Number of pages24
JournalJournal of Financial Research
Volume38
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2015 Jun 1

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Capital structure
Governance structure
Empirical study
Shareholders
Corporate governance
Leverage
Managers
Chief executive officer
Prediction
Speed of adjustment
Managerial incentives
Financial leverage
Debt
Entrenchment
Outside directors
Shareholding
Incentive compensation
Chairmen

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Accounting
  • Finance

Cite this

Liao, Li-Kai ; Mukherjee, Tarun ; Wang, Wei. / Corporate governance and capital structure dynamics : An empirical study. In: Journal of Financial Research. 2015 ; Vol. 38, No. 2. pp. 169-192.
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Corporate governance and capital structure dynamics : An empirical study. / Liao, Li-Kai; Mukherjee, Tarun; Wang, Wei.

In: Journal of Financial Research, Vol. 38, No. 2, 01.06.2015, p. 169-192.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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