Forgery attack on one-time proxy signature and the improvement

Chun Wei Yang, Yi Ping Luo, Tzonelih Hwang

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

4 Citations (Scopus)


This paper points out that in Wang and Wei's scheme (Quantum Inf Process 11:455-463, 2012), an eavesdropper, Eve, can replace the original message of a proxy signature with a forged one of her choice without being detected by the verifier. Accordingly, one of the security requirements of a quantum signature, i.e., unforgeability, may not be satisfied in their scheme. An improvement is given to avoid this attack, and the comparisons with the existing quantum proxy signature are also demonstrated.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)2007-2016
Number of pages10
JournalQuantum Information Processing
Issue number9
Publication statusPublished - 2014 Sep

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Electronic, Optical and Magnetic Materials
  • Statistical and Nonlinear Physics
  • Theoretical Computer Science
  • Signal Processing
  • Modelling and Simulation
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

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