Fuzzy set theory in managerial contract analyses

Hsuan-Chu Lin, Fang Chi Lin, Tzy Yih Hsiao, Yu Cheng Lin

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

6 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper provides a fuzzy solution to managerial contract analyses. The literature shows that due to the existence of information asymmetry, principals could not completely observe real actions of agents. They are actually making contractual decisions subjectively under vague conditions. In this paper, we adopt fuzzy theory to managerial contract analyses and find that it is more efficient than using binary probability methodologies. We also prove that considering the fuzzy factors into the managerial contract analyses scales down agency and production costs and therefore gives a better utility result to a firm.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)4535-4540
Number of pages6
JournalExpert Systems With Applications
Volume36
Issue number3 PART 1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2009 Jan 1

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Fuzzy set theory
Decision making
Costs

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Engineering(all)
  • Computer Science Applications
  • Artificial Intelligence

Cite this

Lin, Hsuan-Chu ; Lin, Fang Chi ; Hsiao, Tzy Yih ; Lin, Yu Cheng. / Fuzzy set theory in managerial contract analyses. In: Expert Systems With Applications. 2009 ; Vol. 36, No. 3 PART 1. pp. 4535-4540.
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Fuzzy set theory in managerial contract analyses. / Lin, Hsuan-Chu; Lin, Fang Chi; Hsiao, Tzy Yih; Lin, Yu Cheng.

In: Expert Systems With Applications, Vol. 36, No. 3 PART 1, 01.01.2009, p. 4535-4540.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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