Fuzzy set theory in managerial contract analyses

Hsuan Chu Lin, Fang Chi Lin, Tzy Yih Hsiao, Yu Cheng Lin

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

7 Citations (Scopus)


This paper provides a fuzzy solution to managerial contract analyses. The literature shows that due to the existence of information asymmetry, principals could not completely observe real actions of agents. They are actually making contractual decisions subjectively under vague conditions. In this paper, we adopt fuzzy theory to managerial contract analyses and find that it is more efficient than using binary probability methodologies. We also prove that considering the fuzzy factors into the managerial contract analyses scales down agency and production costs and therefore gives a better utility result to a firm.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)4535-4540
Number of pages6
JournalExpert Systems With Applications
Issue number3 PART 1
Publication statusPublished - 2009 Apr

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • General Engineering
  • Computer Science Applications
  • Artificial Intelligence


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