Intercept-resend attacks on Chen et al.'s quantum private comparison protocol and the improvements

Jason Lin, Hsin Yi Tseng, Tzone-Lih Hwang

Research output: Contribution to journalComment/debate

51 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Recently, Chen et al. presented a novel quantum private comparison (QPC) protocol using triplet GHZ state to enable two parties to compare the equality of their information without revealing the content. The protocol is rather promising because it only requires single-photon measurement with the help of a semi-honest third party to complete the secret comparison. However, this study will point out that a weakness could occur in the eavesdropping check phase. That is, an intercept-resend attack could be launched by one of the two participants to reveal the information content of the other participant-a result that contradicts to the security requirement of a QPC. Fortunately, two solutions are possible to avoid the attack.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)2412-2414
Number of pages3
JournalOptics Communications
Volume284
Issue number9
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2011 May 1

Fingerprint

attack
Photons
atomic energy levels
requirements
photons

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Electronic, Optical and Magnetic Materials
  • Atomic and Molecular Physics, and Optics
  • Physical and Theoretical Chemistry
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

Cite this

@article{bed37e64693d4d799647886555234b50,
title = "Intercept-resend attacks on Chen et al.'s quantum private comparison protocol and the improvements",
abstract = "Recently, Chen et al. presented a novel quantum private comparison (QPC) protocol using triplet GHZ state to enable two parties to compare the equality of their information without revealing the content. The protocol is rather promising because it only requires single-photon measurement with the help of a semi-honest third party to complete the secret comparison. However, this study will point out that a weakness could occur in the eavesdropping check phase. That is, an intercept-resend attack could be launched by one of the two participants to reveal the information content of the other participant-a result that contradicts to the security requirement of a QPC. Fortunately, two solutions are possible to avoid the attack.",
author = "Jason Lin and Tseng, {Hsin Yi} and Tzone-Lih Hwang",
year = "2011",
month = "5",
day = "1",
doi = "10.1016/j.optcom.2010.12.070",
language = "English",
volume = "284",
pages = "2412--2414",
journal = "Optics Communications",
issn = "0030-4018",
publisher = "Elsevier",
number = "9",

}

Intercept-resend attacks on Chen et al.'s quantum private comparison protocol and the improvements. / Lin, Jason; Tseng, Hsin Yi; Hwang, Tzone-Lih.

In: Optics Communications, Vol. 284, No. 9, 01.05.2011, p. 2412-2414.

Research output: Contribution to journalComment/debate

TY - JOUR

T1 - Intercept-resend attacks on Chen et al.'s quantum private comparison protocol and the improvements

AU - Lin, Jason

AU - Tseng, Hsin Yi

AU - Hwang, Tzone-Lih

PY - 2011/5/1

Y1 - 2011/5/1

N2 - Recently, Chen et al. presented a novel quantum private comparison (QPC) protocol using triplet GHZ state to enable two parties to compare the equality of their information without revealing the content. The protocol is rather promising because it only requires single-photon measurement with the help of a semi-honest third party to complete the secret comparison. However, this study will point out that a weakness could occur in the eavesdropping check phase. That is, an intercept-resend attack could be launched by one of the two participants to reveal the information content of the other participant-a result that contradicts to the security requirement of a QPC. Fortunately, two solutions are possible to avoid the attack.

AB - Recently, Chen et al. presented a novel quantum private comparison (QPC) protocol using triplet GHZ state to enable two parties to compare the equality of their information without revealing the content. The protocol is rather promising because it only requires single-photon measurement with the help of a semi-honest third party to complete the secret comparison. However, this study will point out that a weakness could occur in the eavesdropping check phase. That is, an intercept-resend attack could be launched by one of the two participants to reveal the information content of the other participant-a result that contradicts to the security requirement of a QPC. Fortunately, two solutions are possible to avoid the attack.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=79951933173&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=79951933173&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1016/j.optcom.2010.12.070

DO - 10.1016/j.optcom.2010.12.070

M3 - Comment/debate

AN - SCOPUS:79951933173

VL - 284

SP - 2412

EP - 2414

JO - Optics Communications

JF - Optics Communications

SN - 0030-4018

IS - 9

ER -