Leakage-Resilient Revocable Certificateless Encryption with an Outsourced Revocation Authority

Yuh Min Tseng, Sen Shan Huang, Tung Tso Tsai, Yun Hsin Chuang, Ying Hao Hung

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

7 Citations (Scopus)


To resolve both certificate management and key escrow problems, a certificateless public-key system (CLPKS) has been proposed. However, a CLPKS setting must provide a revocation mechanism to revoke compromised users. Thus, a revocable certificateless public-key system (RCLPKS) was presented to address the revocation issue and, in such a system, the key generation centre (KGC) is responsible to run this revocation functionality. Furthermore, a RCLPKS setting with an outsourced revocation authority (ORA), named RCLPKS-ORA setting, was proposed to employ the ORA to alleviate the KGC's computational burden. Very recently it was noticed that adversaries may adopt side-channel attacks to threaten these existing conventional public-key systems (including CLPKS, RCLPKS and RCLPKS-ORA). Fortunately, leakage-resilient cryptography offers a solution to resist such attacks. In this article, the first leakage-resilient revocable certificateless encryption scheme with an ORA, termed LR-RCLE-ORA scheme, is proposed. The proposed scheme is formally shown to be semantically secure against three types of adversaries in the RCLPKS and RCLPKS-ORA settings while resisting side-channel attacks. In the proposed scheme, adversaries are allowed to continually extract partial ingredients of secret keys participated in various computational algorithms of the proposed scheme while retaining its security.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)151-179
Number of pages29
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - 2022

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Information Systems
  • Applied Mathematics


Dive into the research topics of 'Leakage-Resilient Revocable Certificateless Encryption with an Outsourced Revocation Authority'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this