Managerial empire building and segment reporting quality

The role of auditor industry specialization

Chaur-Shiuh Young, Chia Hui Chen, Fei Liang Chien, Tzu Yi Yu

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

This study aims to explore whether empire building firms have lower segment reporting quality under the new accounting standard-IFRS No. 8, Operating Segments. IFRS No. 8 requires firms to report segment information on basis of the management approach, which implying the opportunity of managerial manipulation. We use the sample of 8 countries that have followed IFRS 8 over the period 2009-2011, and find that when managers with high incentives to build managerial empire will conceal segment reporting information on purpose which leads to lower segment reporting quality. Furthermore, our results show that external auditors with industrial experience attenuate the agency problem of managerial empire building and consequently increase segment reporting quality.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)518-530
Number of pages13
JournalCorporate Ownership and Control
Volume12
Issue number1CONT5
Publication statusPublished - 2014 Sep 1

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Segment reporting
Auditor industry specialization
International Financial Reporting Standards
Incentives
Agency problems
External auditor
Managers
Accounting standards
Manipulation

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Business, Management and Accounting(all)

Cite this

Young, Chaur-Shiuh ; Chen, Chia Hui ; Chien, Fei Liang ; Yu, Tzu Yi. / Managerial empire building and segment reporting quality : The role of auditor industry specialization. In: Corporate Ownership and Control. 2014 ; Vol. 12, No. 1CONT5. pp. 518-530.
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Managerial empire building and segment reporting quality : The role of auditor industry specialization. / Young, Chaur-Shiuh; Chen, Chia Hui; Chien, Fei Liang; Yu, Tzu Yi.

In: Corporate Ownership and Control, Vol. 12, No. 1CONT5, 01.09.2014, p. 518-530.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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