Abstract
This study examines the impact of multiple directorships on the value destruction associated with increases in cash holdings. We find that the marginal value of cash increases with multiple directorships. Furthermore, the positive relationship between cash value and multiple directorships is more pronounced for firms with higher managerial agency problems. Additional analyses suggest that multi-board directors limit a firm’s holdings of excess cash, and especially directors having current industry affiliations have better ability to perform their monitoring function. Firms with multi-board directors make better cash acquisitions. Multiple directorships improve subsequent operating performance associated with capital expenditures and R&D investments. When firms have limited investment opportunities, multiple directorships result in more dividend payouts of cash. Collectively, our results suggest that multiple directorships are associated with a more efficient use of cash, thereby providing direct benefits to shareholders.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Journal | Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Accepted/In press - 2018 Jan 1 |
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All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Accounting
- Business, Management and Accounting(all)
- Finance
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Multiple directorships and the value of cash holdings. / Chou, Ting-Kai; Feng, Hsuan Ling.
In: Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 01.01.2018.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
TY - JOUR
T1 - Multiple directorships and the value of cash holdings
AU - Chou, Ting-Kai
AU - Feng, Hsuan Ling
PY - 2018/1/1
Y1 - 2018/1/1
N2 - This study examines the impact of multiple directorships on the value destruction associated with increases in cash holdings. We find that the marginal value of cash increases with multiple directorships. Furthermore, the positive relationship between cash value and multiple directorships is more pronounced for firms with higher managerial agency problems. Additional analyses suggest that multi-board directors limit a firm’s holdings of excess cash, and especially directors having current industry affiliations have better ability to perform their monitoring function. Firms with multi-board directors make better cash acquisitions. Multiple directorships improve subsequent operating performance associated with capital expenditures and R&D investments. When firms have limited investment opportunities, multiple directorships result in more dividend payouts of cash. Collectively, our results suggest that multiple directorships are associated with a more efficient use of cash, thereby providing direct benefits to shareholders.
AB - This study examines the impact of multiple directorships on the value destruction associated with increases in cash holdings. We find that the marginal value of cash increases with multiple directorships. Furthermore, the positive relationship between cash value and multiple directorships is more pronounced for firms with higher managerial agency problems. Additional analyses suggest that multi-board directors limit a firm’s holdings of excess cash, and especially directors having current industry affiliations have better ability to perform their monitoring function. Firms with multi-board directors make better cash acquisitions. Multiple directorships improve subsequent operating performance associated with capital expenditures and R&D investments. When firms have limited investment opportunities, multiple directorships result in more dividend payouts of cash. Collectively, our results suggest that multiple directorships are associated with a more efficient use of cash, thereby providing direct benefits to shareholders.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85053682440&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85053682440&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/s11156-018-0762-1
DO - 10.1007/s11156-018-0762-1
M3 - Article
JO - Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting
JF - Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting
SN - 0924-865X
ER -