Reduced game and converse consistency

Chih Chang, Cheng-Cheng Hu

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The initiating points of the current paper are the axiomatic characterizations, in terms of consistency, of the equal allocation of nonseparable cost value (by Moulin), the Shapley value (by Hart and Mas-Colell), and the prenucleolus (by Orshan). The basic axioms are the same, but three different reduced games can be used to distinguish these three solutions. The main purpose of the paper is to illustrate that besides the definitions of reduced games are different, the axiom converse consistency also plays an important role to distinguish these three solutions.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)260-278
Number of pages19
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume59
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2007 May 1

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Finance

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