Abstract
We show that an outside innovator has a higher incentive to innovate than an incumbent innovator, by auctioning off his patent rights exclusively to an incumbent firm. For significant innovations this is also superior to selling licenses directly.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 241-244 |
| Number of pages | 4 |
| Journal | Economics Letters |
| Volume | 114 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2012 Mar 1 |
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All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Finance
- Economics and Econometrics
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Selling patent rights and the incentive to innovate. / Tauman, Yair; Weng, Ming Hung.
In: Economics Letters, Vol. 114, No. 3, 01.03.2012, p. 241-244.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
TY - JOUR
T1 - Selling patent rights and the incentive to innovate
AU - Tauman, Yair
AU - Weng, Ming Hung
PY - 2012/3/1
Y1 - 2012/3/1
N2 - We show that an outside innovator has a higher incentive to innovate than an incumbent innovator, by auctioning off his patent rights exclusively to an incumbent firm. For significant innovations this is also superior to selling licenses directly.
AB - We show that an outside innovator has a higher incentive to innovate than an incumbent innovator, by auctioning off his patent rights exclusively to an incumbent firm. For significant innovations this is also superior to selling licenses directly.
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UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=82655162611&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.econlet.2011.10.023
DO - 10.1016/j.econlet.2011.10.023
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:82655162611
VL - 114
SP - 241
EP - 244
JO - Economics Letters
JF - Economics Letters
SN - 0165-1765
IS - 3
ER -