Selling patent rights and the incentive to innovate

Yair Tauman, Ming Hung Weng

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

7 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We show that an outside innovator has a higher incentive to innovate than an incumbent innovator, by auctioning off his patent rights exclusively to an incumbent firm. For significant innovations this is also superior to selling licenses directly.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)241-244
Number of pages4
JournalEconomics Letters
Volume114
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2012 Mar 1

Fingerprint

Incumbents
Innovators
Incentives
Patent rights
License
Innovation

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

Tauman, Yair ; Weng, Ming Hung. / Selling patent rights and the incentive to innovate. In: Economics Letters. 2012 ; Vol. 114, No. 3. pp. 241-244.
@article{235da1d01fb94efe81eb51d270e4183a,
title = "Selling patent rights and the incentive to innovate",
abstract = "We show that an outside innovator has a higher incentive to innovate than an incumbent innovator, by auctioning off his patent rights exclusively to an incumbent firm. For significant innovations this is also superior to selling licenses directly.",
author = "Yair Tauman and Weng, {Ming Hung}",
year = "2012",
month = "3",
day = "1",
doi = "10.1016/j.econlet.2011.10.023",
language = "English",
volume = "114",
pages = "241--244",
journal = "Economics Letters",
issn = "0165-1765",
publisher = "Elsevier",
number = "3",

}

Selling patent rights and the incentive to innovate. / Tauman, Yair; Weng, Ming Hung.

In: Economics Letters, Vol. 114, No. 3, 01.03.2012, p. 241-244.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

TY - JOUR

T1 - Selling patent rights and the incentive to innovate

AU - Tauman, Yair

AU - Weng, Ming Hung

PY - 2012/3/1

Y1 - 2012/3/1

N2 - We show that an outside innovator has a higher incentive to innovate than an incumbent innovator, by auctioning off his patent rights exclusively to an incumbent firm. For significant innovations this is also superior to selling licenses directly.

AB - We show that an outside innovator has a higher incentive to innovate than an incumbent innovator, by auctioning off his patent rights exclusively to an incumbent firm. For significant innovations this is also superior to selling licenses directly.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=82655162611&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=82655162611&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1016/j.econlet.2011.10.023

DO - 10.1016/j.econlet.2011.10.023

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:82655162611

VL - 114

SP - 241

EP - 244

JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

SN - 0165-1765

IS - 3

ER -