Selling patent rights and the incentive to innovate

Yair Tauman; Ming Hung Weng

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2011.10.023

Selling patent rights and the incentive to innovate

Yair Tauman, Ming Hung Weng

Department of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

12 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We show that an outside innovator has a higher incentive to innovate than an incumbent innovator, by auctioning off his patent rights exclusively to an incumbent firm. For significant innovations this is also superior to selling licenses directly.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	241-244
Number of pages	4
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	114
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2011.10.023
Publication status	Published - 2012 Mar

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Finance
Economics and Econometrics

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10.1016/j.econlet.2011.10.023

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Selling patent rights and the incentive to innovate

Abstract

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

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