TY - JOUR
T1 - Spectrum Sharing in cognitive radio networks
T2 - An auction-based approach
AU - Wang, Xinbing
AU - Li, Zheng
AU - Xu, Pengchao
AU - Xu, Youyun
AU - Gao, Xinbo
AU - Chen, Hsiao Hwa
N1 - Funding Information:
Manuscript received December 26, 2008; revised June 22, 2009. First published December 15, 2009; current version published June 16, 2010. This work was supported in part by the National Fundamental Research Grant 2010CB731803 and Grant 2009CB3020402; by the China National Science Foundation Grant 60702046, Grant 60832005, Grant 60632040, and Grant 60972050; by the China Ministry of Education Grant 20070248095; by the Qualcomm Research Grant; by the China International Science and Technology Cooperation Program 2008DFA11630; by the PUJIANG Talents under Grant 08PJ14067; by the Shanghai Innovation Key Project under Grant 08511500400; by the National High Tech Grant 2007AA01Z267 and Grant 2009AA01Z248); and the Taiwan National Science Council Grant NSC 98-2219-E-006-011. This paper was recommended by Associate Editor T. Vasilakos.
PY - 2010/6
Y1 - 2010/6
N2 - Cognitive radio is emerging as a promising technique to improve the utilization of the radio frequency spectrum. In this paper, we consider the problem of spectrum sharing among primary (or "licensed") users (PUs) and secondary (or "unlicensed") users (SUs). We formulate the problem based on bandwidth auction, in which each SU makes a bid for the amount of spectrum and each PU may assign the spectrum among the SUs by itself according to the information from the SUs without degrading its own performance. We show that the auction is a noncooperative game and that Nash equilibrium (NE) can be its solution. We first consider a single-PU network to investigate the existence and uniqueness of the NE and further discuss the fairness among the SUs under given conditions. Then, we present a dynamic updating algorithm in which each SU achieves NE in a distributed manner. The stability condition of the dynamic behavior for this spectrum-sharing scheme is studied. The discussion is generalized to the case in which there are multiple PUs in the network, where the properties of the NE are shown under appropriate conditions. Simulations were used to evaluate the system performance and verify the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm.
AB - Cognitive radio is emerging as a promising technique to improve the utilization of the radio frequency spectrum. In this paper, we consider the problem of spectrum sharing among primary (or "licensed") users (PUs) and secondary (or "unlicensed") users (SUs). We formulate the problem based on bandwidth auction, in which each SU makes a bid for the amount of spectrum and each PU may assign the spectrum among the SUs by itself according to the information from the SUs without degrading its own performance. We show that the auction is a noncooperative game and that Nash equilibrium (NE) can be its solution. We first consider a single-PU network to investigate the existence and uniqueness of the NE and further discuss the fairness among the SUs under given conditions. Then, we present a dynamic updating algorithm in which each SU achieves NE in a distributed manner. The stability condition of the dynamic behavior for this spectrum-sharing scheme is studied. The discussion is generalized to the case in which there are multiple PUs in the network, where the properties of the NE are shown under appropriate conditions. Simulations were used to evaluate the system performance and verify the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm.
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U2 - 10.1109/TSMCB.2009.2034630
DO - 10.1109/TSMCB.2009.2034630
M3 - Article
C2 - 20007053
AN - SCOPUS:77952582544
SN - 1083-4419
VL - 40
SP - 587
EP - 596
JO - IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Part B: Cybernetics
JF - IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Part B: Cybernetics
IS - 3
M1 - 5353648
ER -