The effect of information on supply chain coordination: A model of value discounting

Manh Ha Lam, Wei-Shiun Chang

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

Recent studies have found that decision makers do not perform as expected when they receive much, and frequent, information, that is, retailers order less than the optimal order quantity, assuming rationality, when they get frequent sale feedback. Loss aversion is one of the theories used to explain such behavioral phenomenon. However, the loss aversion model cannot explain why there is a gap between the ordering behaviors in retailing context with buyback and revenue sharing contracts. We propose an alternative model of value discounting to account for such a gap and explain why there is an information effect on the ordering behaviors. We test the theory with an experiment and find that the retailers’ behaviors when facing two contracts and two information schemes match with the predictions of value discounting theory.

Original languageEnglish
JournalAsia Pacific Management Review
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2019 Jan 1

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Supply chain coordination
Discounting
Loss aversion
Retailers
Rationality
Prediction
Retailing
Experiment
Buyback
Decision maker
Revenue-sharing contract
Order quantity
Alternative models
Information effects

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Business and International Management
  • Strategy and Management

Cite this

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