Abstract
This study examines the role of CEO social capital, defined as external directorship ties held by the CEO, in determining family vs. nonfamily CEOs' compensation in a network-based business society and governance system. Using a sample of pooled data of family firms listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange (TSE) from 2000 to 2002, the empirical results show that CEO social capital is an important determinant in setting nonfamily CEOs' pay level, consistent with the expectation of the contractual governance model. By contrast, as expected by relational governance model, family CEOs' social capital is not incentive-relevant. This study extends the literature on CEO compensation by documenting that in a market where guanxi and connections are considered valuable business tools, corporations will be willing to compensate professional CEOs for the social capital that they bring to the firm.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 363-374 |
| Number of pages | 12 |
| Journal | Journal of Business Research |
| Volume | 61 |
| Issue number | 4 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2008 Apr 1 |
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All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Marketing
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The sensitivity of compensation to social capital : Family CEOs vs. nonfamily CEOs in the family business groups. / Young, Chaur Shiuh; Tsai, Liu Ching.
In: Journal of Business Research, Vol. 61, No. 4, 01.04.2008, p. 363-374.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
TY - JOUR
T1 - The sensitivity of compensation to social capital
T2 - Family CEOs vs. nonfamily CEOs in the family business groups
AU - Young, Chaur Shiuh
AU - Tsai, Liu Ching
PY - 2008/4/1
Y1 - 2008/4/1
N2 - This study examines the role of CEO social capital, defined as external directorship ties held by the CEO, in determining family vs. nonfamily CEOs' compensation in a network-based business society and governance system. Using a sample of pooled data of family firms listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange (TSE) from 2000 to 2002, the empirical results show that CEO social capital is an important determinant in setting nonfamily CEOs' pay level, consistent with the expectation of the contractual governance model. By contrast, as expected by relational governance model, family CEOs' social capital is not incentive-relevant. This study extends the literature on CEO compensation by documenting that in a market where guanxi and connections are considered valuable business tools, corporations will be willing to compensate professional CEOs for the social capital that they bring to the firm.
AB - This study examines the role of CEO social capital, defined as external directorship ties held by the CEO, in determining family vs. nonfamily CEOs' compensation in a network-based business society and governance system. Using a sample of pooled data of family firms listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange (TSE) from 2000 to 2002, the empirical results show that CEO social capital is an important determinant in setting nonfamily CEOs' pay level, consistent with the expectation of the contractual governance model. By contrast, as expected by relational governance model, family CEOs' social capital is not incentive-relevant. This study extends the literature on CEO compensation by documenting that in a market where guanxi and connections are considered valuable business tools, corporations will be willing to compensate professional CEOs for the social capital that they bring to the firm.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=39649110318&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=39649110318&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.jbusres.2007.07.022
DO - 10.1016/j.jbusres.2007.07.022
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:39649110318
VL - 61
SP - 363
EP - 374
JO - Journal of Business Research
JF - Journal of Business Research
SN - 0148-2963
IS - 4
ER -