The sensitivity of compensation to social capital: Family CEOs vs. nonfamily CEOs in the family business groups

Chaur Shiuh Young, Liu Ching Tsai

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

29 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This study examines the role of CEO social capital, defined as external directorship ties held by the CEO, in determining family vs. nonfamily CEOs' compensation in a network-based business society and governance system. Using a sample of pooled data of family firms listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange (TSE) from 2000 to 2002, the empirical results show that CEO social capital is an important determinant in setting nonfamily CEOs' pay level, consistent with the expectation of the contractual governance model. By contrast, as expected by relational governance model, family CEOs' social capital is not incentive-relevant. This study extends the literature on CEO compensation by documenting that in a market where guanxi and connections are considered valuable business tools, corporations will be willing to compensate professional CEOs for the social capital that they bring to the firm.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)363-374
Number of pages12
JournalJournal of Business Research
Volume61
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2008 Apr 1

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Chief executive officer
Social capital
Family business
Business groups
CEO compensation
Governance
Business and society
Guanxi
Relational governance
Incentives
Family firms
Empirical results
Taiwan Stock Exchange
CEO pay

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Marketing

Cite this

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The sensitivity of compensation to social capital : Family CEOs vs. nonfamily CEOs in the family business groups. / Young, Chaur Shiuh; Tsai, Liu Ching.

In: Journal of Business Research, Vol. 61, No. 4, 01.04.2008, p. 363-374.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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