TY - JOUR
T1 - Understanding the political goals of non-binding resolutions
T2 - evidence from the Mexican Chamber of Deputies
AU - Ponce, Aldo F.
AU - Velázquez López Velarde, Rodrigo
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2019, © 2019 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.
Copyright:
Copyright 2019 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.
PY - 2019/4/3
Y1 - 2019/4/3
N2 - By primarily focusing on bill initiatives, the literature on legislatures and parliaments has understudied other important legislative instruments -such as non-binding resolutions, minutes or speeches- which might help parties and legislators achieve their electoral and policy goals. Non-binding resolutions (NBRs) do not carry the force of law and are primarily used for parties or legislators’ position taking and the request of government actions. This article examines the political goals of NBRs by examining these tools in the lower chamber of the Mexican Congress. Employing a novel dataset, we claim that legislators strategically utilise NBRs to strengthen their relationship with their political principals. We find differences on the use of these instruments across political parties, based on the types of policy areas they choose to target. The analysis also indicates that SMD legislators tend to introduce more particularistic NBRs that might further their political careers at the subnational level.
AB - By primarily focusing on bill initiatives, the literature on legislatures and parliaments has understudied other important legislative instruments -such as non-binding resolutions, minutes or speeches- which might help parties and legislators achieve their electoral and policy goals. Non-binding resolutions (NBRs) do not carry the force of law and are primarily used for parties or legislators’ position taking and the request of government actions. This article examines the political goals of NBRs by examining these tools in the lower chamber of the Mexican Congress. Employing a novel dataset, we claim that legislators strategically utilise NBRs to strengthen their relationship with their political principals. We find differences on the use of these instruments across political parties, based on the types of policy areas they choose to target. The analysis also indicates that SMD legislators tend to introduce more particularistic NBRs that might further their political careers at the subnational level.
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U2 - 10.1080/13572334.2019.1603207
DO - 10.1080/13572334.2019.1603207
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85064699514
SN - 1357-2334
VL - 25
SP - 229
EP - 249
JO - The Journal of Legislative Studies
JF - The Journal of Legislative Studies
IS - 2
ER -