TY - GEN
T1 - When Virtual Network Operator Meets E-Commerce Platform
T2 - 29th IEEE/ACM International Symposium on Quality of Service, IWQOS 2021
AU - Cheng, Qi
AU - Shan, Hangguan
AU - Zhuang, Weihua
AU - Quek, Tony Q.S.
AU - Zhang, Zhaoyang
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2021 IEEE.
PY - 2021/6/25
Y1 - 2021/6/25
N2 - In China, some e-commerce platform (EP) companies such as Alibaba and JD have been now allowed to partner with network operators (NOs) to act as virtual network operators (VNOs) to provide mobile data services for mobile users (MUs). However, it is a question worth researching on how to generate more profits for all network players after EP companies being VNOs through appropriate integration of the VNO business and the companies' own e-commerce business. To address this issue, in this work we propose a novel incentive mechanism for advertising via mobile data reward, and model it as a three-stage Stackelberg game. In Stage I, the NO decides the price of mobile data for the VNO; in Stage II, the VNO decides its data plan fee for MUs and the ad price for e-commerce merchants (EMs); in Stage III, the MUs make their own decisions on the data plan subscription and the number of ads to be watched, while the EMs decide the number of ad slots they buy from the EP. We obtain the closed-form optimal solution of the Nash equilibrium by backward induction. Simulation results show the impact of the system parameters on the utilities of game players and social welfare, and reveal that the solution can indeed lead to a quadri-win outcome in some cases. At the same time, we summarize some insights that have economic guidance.
AB - In China, some e-commerce platform (EP) companies such as Alibaba and JD have been now allowed to partner with network operators (NOs) to act as virtual network operators (VNOs) to provide mobile data services for mobile users (MUs). However, it is a question worth researching on how to generate more profits for all network players after EP companies being VNOs through appropriate integration of the VNO business and the companies' own e-commerce business. To address this issue, in this work we propose a novel incentive mechanism for advertising via mobile data reward, and model it as a three-stage Stackelberg game. In Stage I, the NO decides the price of mobile data for the VNO; in Stage II, the VNO decides its data plan fee for MUs and the ad price for e-commerce merchants (EMs); in Stage III, the MUs make their own decisions on the data plan subscription and the number of ads to be watched, while the EMs decide the number of ad slots they buy from the EP. We obtain the closed-form optimal solution of the Nash equilibrium by backward induction. Simulation results show the impact of the system parameters on the utilities of game players and social welfare, and reveal that the solution can indeed lead to a quadri-win outcome in some cases. At the same time, we summarize some insights that have economic guidance.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85115353242&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85115353242&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/IWQOS52092.2021.9521292
DO - 10.1109/IWQOS52092.2021.9521292
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85115353242
T3 - 2021 IEEE/ACM 29th International Symposium on Quality of Service, IWQOS 2021
BT - 2021 IEEE/ACM 29th International Symposium on Quality of Service, IWQOS 2021
PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Y2 - 25 June 2021 through 28 June 2021
ER -