On the Application of Cooperative Game Theory for Interplant Water Indirect Integration

Abstract

A successful total-site water integration (TSWI) project should be facilitated by not only an optimal design of minimum-cost multi-plant water network (MPWN) but also a “fair” profit-sharing scheme In this work the proposed approach to address both issues is implemented in two stages The minimum total annual cost of each and every potential coalition on an industrial park is first determined according to two different design strategies One is to synthesize the MPWN directly based on the process data of all existing water-using units while the other is to produce the optimal single-plant WNs first and then integrate them into a MPWN The cost-saving allocation problem is dealt with in the second stage on the basis of several criteria of the cooperative game theory i e the core the Shapley value and the risk-based Shapley value In particular a definite portion of the total annual cost-saving of the MPWN can be determined at designated time intervals for allocation to each plant by considering both its contribution level and also the risk of potential fallouts of unexpected plant shutdowns in a coalition Furthermore it should be noted that the plant life is viewed as a random variable that follows the exponential distribution in this study and thus the corresponding risk-based Shapley value is time dependent An appropriate MPWN design and the corresponding benefit-allocation plan can be chosen for a designated period of time The proposed methodology is illustrated in detail in two simple examples in this thesis

Date of Award	2019
Original language	English
Supervisor	Chuei-Tin Chang (Supervisor)