Research on the competition between the manufacturer and the third-party using the authorization strategy in the after-sales market

Abstract

In the after-sales market third-parties that engage in product repair grow rapidly and compete directly with the manufacturer’s product repair Therefore in this thesis we consider that the manufacturer works with an authorized repair center based on the authorization strategy to increase the market share Two categories of the authorization strategy are considered: partial authorization and full authorization The difference between two strategies is in their ability to repair failed products The market demand model is based on consumer utility theory which depends on the consumers’ valuation repair price and repair time We develop three game-theory models to analyze the competition in the after-sales market find the equilibrium prices and royalty fee The numerical results show that the manufacturer prefers the partial authorization strategy and there is a threshold value of the parameters that causes the manufacturer to change its pricing decision Furthermore we conduct sensitivity analysis to show the impacts of changing the parameters on the equilibrium results and derive the managerial insights

Date of Award	2019
Original language	English
Supervisor	Chung-Chi Hsieh (Supervisor)