AbstractIn this paper we investigate what determine share pledging behavior of the directors and supervisors What give them incentives to do different behavior some directors and supervisors never do share collateral others continue doing and still others pledge high shares? Nowadays the high share pledge ratio which has been considered as a warning that tells us that someone is hollowing out company's assets is still done by the directors and supervisors Why is that? Most of previous studies focus on the consequences of shares pledging behavior rather than the causes of shares pledging behavior This paper attempts to provide the factors of directors and supervisors’ share collateralization This paper uses the data of Taiwanese publicly listed companies from the Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) database from 2000 to 2012 Firstly we use logit model to assess whether independent variables are suitable with subsample which are pledging shares for 13 year-end and non-pledging shares for 13 year-end Then we use tobit model to assess with full sample Both are used to measure and explain variables from three perspective: firm characteristics stock price and corporate governance And it can stronger the results and remove the error of the results which are caused by incorrect statistical method by using two different models Our empirical results indicate that shares pledging behavior of the directors and supervisors has connections with firm characteristics stock price and corporate governance The research findings also indicate that the existence of supervision of creditors of the firms helps with reducing agency problem In addition we use the types of control of business groups data constructed by TEJ and find that the family control type which compared with the professional manager control is more likely to do shares pledging behavior Finally our empirical results support corporate governance in the firms which have shares pledging behavior of the directors and supervisors is easier causing agency problem between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders than in the firms which have no shares pledging behavior of the directors and supervisors Controlling shareholders could have more power to gain the interests from exploiting minority shareholders by pledging shares
|Date of Award||2014 Jun 16|
|Supervisor||Tse-Shih Wang (Supervisor)|
What determine share pledging behavior of the directors and supervisors?
怡璇, 賴. (Author). 2014 Jun 16
Student thesis: Master's Thesis