A Cooperative Coalitional Game in Duopolistic Supply-Chain Competition

Cheng Chang Lin, Chao Chen Hsieh

研究成果: Article同行評審

11 引文 斯高帕斯(Scopus)


Cooperative coalitional games study the selection of chain partners, the formation of supply chains and outcome allocations. The chain value of a coalition depends on the outcome of inter-chain competition. Subsequently, chain partners may accept their payoffs or decide to defect to another coalition that has made a higher tender offer. The formation and defection continues until a stable Cournot-Nash equilibrium is reached. This is the state where no player may unilaterally defect to another coalition and earn a higher profit. We formulate the cooperative coalitional game as a variational inequality problem and propose an iterative diagonalization algorithm to determine the steady state for the game. The computational results illustrated that (1) supply-chain competition may not necessarily preserve the same level of social welfare; (2) internalization of resources and costs may distort the general competition economy; and (3) wielding the power in a supply chain does not necessarily translate into higher profits.

頁(從 - 到)129-146
期刊Networks and Spatial Economics
出版狀態Published - 2012 三月

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • 軟體
  • 電腦網路與通信
  • 人工智慧


深入研究「A Cooperative Coalitional Game in Duopolistic Supply-Chain Competition」主題。共同形成了獨特的指紋。