A non-cooperative interpretation of the kernel

Chih Chang, Cheng Cheng Hu

研究成果: Article同行評審

6 引文 斯高帕斯(Scopus)

摘要

The purpose of the paper is to propose a bargaining game to interpret the kernel non-cooperatively. Based on the idea of the Davis-Maschler reduced game, a bilateral bargaining procedure is provided in our game model. We show that the set of all subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of our non-cooperative game coincides with the kernel for transferable utility games.

原文English
頁(從 - 到)185-204
頁數20
期刊International Journal of Game Theory
46
發行號1
DOIs
出版狀態Published - 2017 三月 1

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • 統計與概率
  • 數學(雜項)
  • 社會科學(雜項)
  • 經濟學與計量經濟學
  • 統計、概率和不確定性

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