A study on coordination of capacity allocation for different types of contractual retailers

Yeu Shiang Huang, Jun Ming Chen, Zu Liang Lin

研究成果: Article同行評審

12 引文 斯高帕斯(Scopus)


Because the demand is uncertain and it is impossible to expand capacity immediately, suppliers in supply chains are faced with insufficient capacity. As a result, they are unable to satisfy fully the demand from many retailers. Sometimes the use of additional shifts or outsourcing may resolve the problem, but many times, suppliers have to seek ways to appropriately allocate their limited capacity to the retailers. A non-cooperative coordinative mechanism is often required which has to be acceptable and beneficial for all members of the supply chain. This study considers a supply chain with a single supplier and multiple retailers in which the retailers are categorized into two types: ordinary and privileged, according to the steadiness of their partnership with the supplier. The primary concern is to coordinate the capacity allocation within the supply chain with the uses of quantity discount and strategic price-quantity auction with consideration of maintaining fairness and a long-term steady partnership. Our analytical results show that both parties benefit from these coordination mechanisms since the supplier's profit increases because the retailers are incentivized to place orders with higher quantities, lowering the cost of idle capacity and increasing revenues. In the meantime, retailers are able to trim down their ordering costs and fairly compete for limited capacity, which reduces the transaction risks and shortage costs for uncertain demands, and thus increases their profits.

頁(從 - 到)919-928
期刊Decision Support Systems
出版狀態Published - 2013 1月

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • 管理資訊系統
  • 資訊系統
  • 發展與教育心理學
  • 藝術與人文(雜項)
  • 資訊系統與管理


深入研究「A study on coordination of capacity allocation for different types of contractual retailers」主題。共同形成了獨特的指紋。