An Auction-Based Multiagent Simulation for the Matching Problem in Dynamic Vehicle Routing Problem with Occasional Drivers

Chung Wei Shen, Che Cheng Hsu, Kuan Hua Tseng

研究成果: Article同行評審

1 引文 斯高帕斯(Scopus)

摘要

This research incorporated an auction mechanism into the vehicle routing problem with occasional drivers and produced simulations in an agent-based environment. Auctions were used to match online orders with potential occasional drivers. While a centralized system optimizes system performance under global objectives, the novel decentralized approach presented here illustrates emergent phenomena resulting from the interaction of individual entities in highly dynamic cases. In the simulations, the auctions were executed after a fixed time interval called a rolling time horizon. Our results suggest that the appropriate rolling time horizon produces a lower average unit compensation cost because better matches can be found when the accumulation of online orders and occasional drivers is maintained at a certain level. The simulation results also indicate that the use of an auction mechanism instead of simple nonauction rules can improve the average unit compensation cost by up to 25.1%.

原文English
文章編號2999162
期刊Journal of Advanced Transportation
2022
DOIs
出版狀態Published - 2022

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • 汽車工程
  • 經濟學與計量經濟學
  • 機械工業
  • 電腦科學應用
  • 策略與管理

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