An axiomatization of the kernel for TU games through reduced game monotonicity and reduced dominance

Theo Driessen, Cheng Cheng Hu

研究成果: Article同行評審

摘要

In the framework of transferable utility games, we modify the 2-person Davis-Maschler reduced game to ensure non-emptiness (NE) of the imputation set of the adapted 2-person reduced game. Based on the modification, we propose two new axioms: reduced game monotonicity (RGM) and reduced dominance (RD). Using RGM, RD, NE, Covariance under strategic equivalence, Equal treatment property and Pareto optimality, we are able to characterize the kernel.

原文English
頁(從 - 到)1-12
頁數12
期刊Theory and Decision
74
發行號1
DOIs
出版狀態Published - 2013 一月

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Decision Sciences(all)
  • Developmental and Educational Psychology
  • Arts and Humanities (miscellaneous)
  • Applied Psychology
  • Social Sciences(all)
  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)
  • Computer Science Applications

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