Causal inferences as perceptual judgments

John R. Anderson, Ching-Fan Sheu

研究成果: Article同行評審

119 引文 斯高帕斯(Scopus)

摘要

We analyze how subjects make causal judgments based on contingency information in two paradigms. In the discrete paradigm, subjects are given specific information about the frequency a, with which a purported cause occurs with the effect; the frequency b, with which it occurs without the effect; the frequency c, with which the effect occurs when the cause is absent; and the frequency d, with which both cause and effect are absent. Subjects respond to P 1 =a/(a+b) and P 2 =c/(c+d). Some subjects' ratings are just a function of P 1, while others are a function of ΔP =P 1 -P 2. Subjects' postexperiment reports are accurate reflections of which model they use. Combining these two types of subjects results in data well fit by the weighted ΔP model (Allan, 1993). In the continuous paradigm, subjects control the purported causes (by clicking a mouse) and observe whether an effect occurs. Because causes and effects occur continuously in time, it is not possible to explicitly pair causes and effects. Rather, subjects report that they are responding to the rate at which the effects occur when they click versus when they do not click. Their ratings are a function of rates and not probabilities. In general, we argue that subjects' causal ratings are judgments of the magnitude of perceptually salient variables in the experiment.

原文English
頁(從 - 到)510-524
頁數15
期刊Memory & Cognition
23
發行號4
DOIs
出版狀態Published - 1995 七月 1

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • 神經心理學與生理心理學
  • 實驗與認知心理學
  • 藝術與人文(雜項)

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