TY - JOUR
T1 - Clientelistic parties and satisfaction with democracy
AU - Wang, Yi Ting
N1 - Funding Information:
The author wishes to thank Herbert Kitschelt and the participants of the 2011 Workshop on Democratic Accountability Strategies at Duke University and 2013 Quality of Government Conference at the University of Gothenburg for their comments on earlier versions of this manuscript. The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Publisher Copyright:
© The Author(s) 2018.
PY - 2020/7/1
Y1 - 2020/7/1
N2 - Using both a cross-national data set on parties’ accountability strategies and public opinion survey data, this article provides a systematic analysis of how parties’ reliance on clientelistic strategies correlates with citizen evaluations of regime performance. Our analyses suggest that in systems where parties in general rely more heavily on clientelism, principles of democratic equality are undermined, and citizens on average express a lower level of satisfaction. In addition to democratic norms, material benefits are also closely related to citizens’ regime evaluations. Within countries, supporters of parties that make substantial clientelistic efforts are more satisfied than other citizens, because they are likely to be beneficiaries of this accountability mode. This within-country gap between clientelistic and non-clientelistic parties’ supporters widens where the clientelistic parties deliver benefits more effectively and in countries with lower overall democratic quality.
AB - Using both a cross-national data set on parties’ accountability strategies and public opinion survey data, this article provides a systematic analysis of how parties’ reliance on clientelistic strategies correlates with citizen evaluations of regime performance. Our analyses suggest that in systems where parties in general rely more heavily on clientelism, principles of democratic equality are undermined, and citizens on average express a lower level of satisfaction. In addition to democratic norms, material benefits are also closely related to citizens’ regime evaluations. Within countries, supporters of parties that make substantial clientelistic efforts are more satisfied than other citizens, because they are likely to be beneficiaries of this accountability mode. This within-country gap between clientelistic and non-clientelistic parties’ supporters widens where the clientelistic parties deliver benefits more effectively and in countries with lower overall democratic quality.
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U2 - 10.1177/1354068818784965
DO - 10.1177/1354068818784965
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85049672815
SN - 1354-0688
VL - 26
SP - 402
EP - 414
JO - Party Politics
JF - Party Politics
IS - 4
ER -