Corporate governance and capital structure dynamics: An empirical study

Li-Kai Liao, Tarun Mukherjee, Wei Wang

研究成果: Article

19 引文 斯高帕斯(Scopus)

摘要

Consistent with theoretical predictions, we find that both a higher level of financial leverage and a faster speed of adjustment of leverage toward the shareholders' desired level are associated with better corporate governance quality as defined by a more independent board featuring CEO-chairman separation and greater presence of outside directors, coupled with larger institutional shareholding. In contrast, managerial incentive compensation on average discourages use of debt or adjustments toward the shareholders' desired level, consistent with its entrenchment effect. The effect of corporate governance on leverage adjustments is most pronounced when initial leverage is between the manager's desired level and the shareholders' desired level where the interests of managers and shareholders conflict.

原文English
頁(從 - 到)169-192
頁數24
期刊Journal of Financial Research
38
發行號2
DOIs
出版狀態Published - 2015 六月 1

    指紋

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Accounting
  • Finance

引用此