Directorship, collateralized shares, risk, and performance of Taiwan banking industry

Yi Kai Chen, Lanfeng Kao, Tse-Shih Wang, Ming Hsuan Hsieh

研究成果: Article

摘要

In recent years, considerable concerns have arisen over the issue of corporate governance in banks' supervision. One of the major issues has been investigated whether the sound mechanism of corporate governance benefits bank risk management and performance. The collateralized shares, serving stocks as collaterals, are one of financial leverage approaches and it is likely to be an incentive for block shareholders to misapply assets due to the deviation between the controlship and the ownership. The objective of this study is to examine whether the attitude of the board of directors toward risk will affect the bank risk and performance. Quarterly data of commercial banks listed either on the Taiwan Stock Exchange or GreTai Securities Market from 1999 to 2007 are examined in this study. The results show that the collateralized shares may have contributed to a lower return due to a higher risk and they are in line with previous studies our results are in line with previous researches. In conclusion, the monitoring mechanism should enforce relatively regulations more strictly to avoid the agency problems. Especially to the insiders of influence such as board of directors or block shareholders, more strictly regulations and the disclosure of relatively information should be necessary. The result will be expected to lead to better understanding of the nature of the collateralized shares and laying the groundwork for realizing that is the collateralized shares worth monitoring. It may provide policy implication for the regulators in the later monitoring requirement.

原文English
頁(從 - 到)57-71
頁數15
期刊Corporate Ownership and Control
6
發行號1 SPEC. ISS.
出版狀態Published - 2008

指紋

Monitoring
Banking industry
Taiwan
Board of directors
Bank risk
Shareholders
Corporate governance
Bank supervision
Assets
Risk management
Financial leverage
Agency problems
Taiwan Stock Exchange
Ownership
Securities market
Insider
Disclosure
Incentives
Policy implications
Deviation

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Business, Management and Accounting(all)

引用此文

Chen, Yi Kai ; Kao, Lanfeng ; Wang, Tse-Shih ; Hsieh, Ming Hsuan. / Directorship, collateralized shares, risk, and performance of Taiwan banking industry. 於: Corporate Ownership and Control. 2008 ; 卷 6, 編號 1 SPEC. ISS. 頁 57-71.
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Directorship, collateralized shares, risk, and performance of Taiwan banking industry. / Chen, Yi Kai; Kao, Lanfeng; Wang, Tse-Shih; Hsieh, Ming Hsuan.

於: Corporate Ownership and Control, 卷 6, 編號 1 SPEC. ISS., 2008, p. 57-71.

研究成果: Article

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