Ethnic Group Inequality, Partisan Networks, and Political Clientelism

Yi-Ting Wang, Kiril Kolev

研究成果: Article

3 引文 (Scopus)

摘要

How do ethnic group divisions affect parties’ linkage strategies? The provision of private or local club goods favoring co-ethnics by politicians has been well documented in the literature. However, whether clientelism tends to be more widespread in ethnically highly fragmented societies has not been systematically examined. Utilizing a dataset that includes information on more than 450 parties in eighty competitive party systems, we show that the mere presence of multiple ethnic groups does not lead to more clientelistic exchange. Nevertheless, in countries characterized by high levels of economic inequality between politically relevant ethnic groups, parties are more likely to rely on clientelistic strategies to attract votes. In addition, this positive relationship between ethnic income inequality and clientelism is contingent on parties’ ties to ethnic social networks. Specifically, in ethnically unequal societies, parties that can rely on existing ethnic organizations particularly engage in clientelistic modes of electoral mobilization.

原文English
頁(從 - 到)329-341
頁數13
期刊Political Research Quarterly
72
發行號2
DOIs
出版狀態Published - 2019 六月 1

指紋

clientelism
ethnic group
party system
club
society
mobilization
politician
voter
social network
income
economics

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Sociology and Political Science

引用此文

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Ethnic Group Inequality, Partisan Networks, and Political Clientelism. / Wang, Yi-Ting; Kolev, Kiril.

於: Political Research Quarterly, 卷 72, 編號 2, 01.06.2019, p. 329-341.

研究成果: Article

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