Ethnic Group Inequality, Partisan Networks, and Political Clientelism

Yi Ting Wang, Kiril Kolev

研究成果: Article同行評審

9 引文 斯高帕斯(Scopus)


How do ethnic group divisions affect parties’ linkage strategies? The provision of private or local club goods favoring co-ethnics by politicians has been well documented in the literature. However, whether clientelism tends to be more widespread in ethnically highly fragmented societies has not been systematically examined. Utilizing a dataset that includes information on more than 450 parties in eighty competitive party systems, we show that the mere presence of multiple ethnic groups does not lead to more clientelistic exchange. Nevertheless, in countries characterized by high levels of economic inequality between politically relevant ethnic groups, parties are more likely to rely on clientelistic strategies to attract votes. In addition, this positive relationship between ethnic income inequality and clientelism is contingent on parties’ ties to ethnic social networks. Specifically, in ethnically unequal societies, parties that can rely on existing ethnic organizations particularly engage in clientelistic modes of electoral mobilization.

頁(從 - 到)329-341
期刊Political Research Quarterly
出版狀態Published - 2019 6月 1

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • 社會學與政治學


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