Forgery attack on one-time proxy signature and the improvement

Chun Wei Yang, Yi Ping Luo, Tzonelih Hwang

研究成果: Article

4 引文 斯高帕斯(Scopus)


This paper points out that in Wang and Wei's scheme (Quantum Inf Process 11:455-463, 2012), an eavesdropper, Eve, can replace the original message of a proxy signature with a forged one of her choice without being detected by the verifier. Accordingly, one of the security requirements of a quantum signature, i.e., unforgeability, may not be satisfied in their scheme. An improvement is given to avoid this attack, and the comparisons with the existing quantum proxy signature are also demonstrated.

頁(從 - 到)2007-2016
期刊Quantum Information Processing
出版狀態Published - 2014 九月

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Electronic, Optical and Magnetic Materials
  • Statistical and Nonlinear Physics
  • Theoretical Computer Science
  • Signal Processing
  • Modelling and Simulation
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

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