Fuzzy set theory in managerial contract analyses

Hsuan Chu Lin, Fang Chi Lin, Tzy Yih Hsiao, Yu Cheng Lin

研究成果: Article同行評審

7 引文 斯高帕斯(Scopus)

摘要

This paper provides a fuzzy solution to managerial contract analyses. The literature shows that due to the existence of information asymmetry, principals could not completely observe real actions of agents. They are actually making contractual decisions subjectively under vague conditions. In this paper, we adopt fuzzy theory to managerial contract analyses and find that it is more efficient than using binary probability methodologies. We also prove that considering the fuzzy factors into the managerial contract analyses scales down agency and production costs and therefore gives a better utility result to a firm.

原文English
頁(從 - 到)4535-4540
頁數6
期刊Expert Systems With Applications
36
發行號3 PART 1
DOIs
出版狀態Published - 2009 4月

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • 一般工程
  • 電腦科學應用
  • 人工智慧

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