TY - JOUR
T1 - Intercept-Resend Attacks on Semi-quantum Secret Sharing and the Improvements
AU - Lin, Jason
AU - Yang, Chun Wei
AU - Tsai, Chia Wei
AU - Hwang, Tzonelih
N1 - Funding Information:
Acknowledgements The authors would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their very valuable comments that enhance the clarity of this paper a lot. We also like to thank the National Science Council of Republic of China and the Research Center for Quantum Communication and Security, National Cheng Kung University, Taiwan, R.O.C. for the financial support of this research under Contract No. NSC 100-2221-E-006-152-MY3 and D100-36002, respectively.
PY - 2013/1
Y1 - 2013/1
N2 - Recently, Li et al. [Phys. Rev. A 82(2):022303, 2010] presented two semi-quantum secret sharing (SQSS) protocols using Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger-like states. The proposed schemes are quite practical because only the secret dealer needs to be equipped with advanced quantum devices such as quantum memory, whereas the other agents can merely perform classical operations to complete the secret sharing. However, the present study demonstrates the existence of a security pitfall in the eavesdropping check phase of both the schemes, which can lead to an intercept-resend attack and a Trojan horse attack on the two schemes by a dishonest agent, to determine the other agent's shadow and consequently derive the master key of the SQSS. This contradicts the security requirement of QSS. Fortunately, two possible solutions are proposed herein to eliminate this security pitfall.
AB - Recently, Li et al. [Phys. Rev. A 82(2):022303, 2010] presented two semi-quantum secret sharing (SQSS) protocols using Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger-like states. The proposed schemes are quite practical because only the secret dealer needs to be equipped with advanced quantum devices such as quantum memory, whereas the other agents can merely perform classical operations to complete the secret sharing. However, the present study demonstrates the existence of a security pitfall in the eavesdropping check phase of both the schemes, which can lead to an intercept-resend attack and a Trojan horse attack on the two schemes by a dishonest agent, to determine the other agent's shadow and consequently derive the master key of the SQSS. This contradicts the security requirement of QSS. Fortunately, two possible solutions are proposed herein to eliminate this security pitfall.
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U2 - 10.1007/s10773-012-1314-4
DO - 10.1007/s10773-012-1314-4
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84871451694
VL - 52
SP - 156
EP - 162
JO - International Journal of Theoretical Physics
JF - International Journal of Theoretical Physics
SN - 0020-7748
IS - 1
ER -