The gap between electoral winners and losers in democratic satisfaction has been well documented in the literature. Scholars further argue that in consensual systems, where the institutional design involves more power sharing, the winner-loser gap is smaller than in majoritarian systems. However, how the powers of legislatures, the primary national-level agency to impose restraints on the executive, affect the winner-loser gap has not been thoroughly studied. Utilizing data of 29 countries in the world over ten years, this paper verifies that in presidential democracies, when legislatures have more oversight power, the winner-loser gap in satisfaction tends to be reduced. The relationships are particularly evident when opposition parties have distinct policy platforms, as these oppositions are better able to utilize the legislative arena to voice their positions. Furthermore, the effect of legislative strength on losers’ consent is more pronounced among voters who are more interested in politics.
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes