Network externality and incentive to invest in network security

Chun Hsiung Liao, Chun Wei Chen

研究成果: Article同行評審

10 引文 斯高帕斯(Scopus)


Breaches of network security can result in substantial losses for businesses. A game theory-based model is developed to investigate in the short run how network externality influences the optimal strategy of competing online firms producing homogenous services to invest in NS. A firm's self-protect rate and survival probability against NS security incidents differ depending on its related investment decisions. The incentive of a firm to invest in NS is derived, and the impact of the survival probability and the effect of the number of firms investing in NS on a firm's incentive to invest in NS are also analyzed. Policy implications drawn from the study are provided at the end the work.

頁(從 - 到)398-404
期刊Economic Modelling
出版狀態Published - 2014 1月

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • 經濟學與計量經濟學


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