Party Capability versus Court Preference: Why do the ‘Haves’ Come Out Ahead?—An Empirical Lesson from the Taiwan Supreme Court: Why Do the "Haves" Come Out Ahead? - An Empirical Lesson from the Taiwan Supreme Court

Kong Pin Chen, Kuo Chang Huang, Chang Ching Lin

研究成果: Article同行評審

13 引文 斯高帕斯(Scopus)

摘要

Using civil appeals data on Taiwan's Supreme Court (TSC), this article revisits the well-known question of whether the "haves" come out ahead in litigations. We first show that the higher-status litigants indeed mobilized stronger legal representation and obtained more victories than the lower-status litigants. However, we submit that that the party capability theory cannot fully explain the advantages the "haves" enjoyed over the "have-nots." Further analysis reveals that the TSC's exercise of discretionary jurisdiction also played an important role by strongly favoring the governmental litigants at the agenda-setting stage. We argue that the TSC's preference in this regard was induced by the TSC judges' self-identification as part of government. In conclusion, our empirical investigation shows that both party capability and court preference contribute to influence the outcomes of appeals.

原文English
頁(從 - 到)93-126
頁數34
期刊Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization
31
發行號1
DOIs
出版狀態Published - 2015 3月 1

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • 經濟學與計量經濟學
  • 組織行為與人力資源管理
  • 法律

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