Platform entry and homing as competitive strategies under cross-sided network effects

Cheng Han Wu, Netnapha Chamnisampan

研究成果: Article同行評審

15 引文 斯高帕斯(Scopus)


In a competitive environment, determining when to enter the market and what homing policies should be adopted are crucial strategic decisions for platform-based businesses. In this study, we investigate the interactions between two platforms competing in two-sided markets with cross-sided network effects and determine their prices under different entry and homing strategies. We derive the equilibrium demands of two-sided markets for platforms and the equilibrium prices for two competing platforms. We further conduct a comparative analysis among scenarios with different combinations of homing and entry strategies. We find that early-entry platforms will preserve high margins in large early markets, where fierce price competition occurs once their rivals enter these markets. However, early entry is not always beneficial for platforms because the market-cannibalization effect emerges in the subsequent period. Furthermore, this effect will be amplified by the platforms' homing and entry strategies. In addition, cross-sided network effects lead buyers, sellers, and platforms to prefer a multi-homing policy, which is beneficial for society as a whole. Managerial insights are also provided for platform-based businesses.

期刊Decision Support Systems
出版狀態Published - 2021 1月

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • 管理資訊系統
  • 資訊系統
  • 發展與教育心理學
  • 藝術與人文(雜項)
  • 資訊系統與管理


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