Quality investment and inspection policy in a supplier-manufacturer supply chain

Chung Chi Hsieh, Yu Te Liu

研究成果: Article同行評審

85 引文 斯高帕斯(Scopus)

摘要

This paper examines a serial supply chain that consists of one supplier and one manufacturer, each having imperfect production and inspection processes. Both the supplier and the manufacturer invest in quality improvement actions in their production processes to reduce defective items being produced. In addition to quality investment, the supplier engages in outbound inspection before sending the components to the manufacturer, and the manufacturer engages in inbound inspection, when receiving the components from the supplier, and outbound inspection, before sending final products to customers. We investigate the supplier's and the manufacturer's quality investment and inspection strategies in four noncooperative games with different degrees of information revealed. We study the effects of inspection-related information on both parties' equilibrium strategies and profits, and further assess, at equilibrium, the rationality of the penalty on defective components.

原文English
頁(從 - 到)717-729
頁數13
期刊European Journal of Operational Research
202
發行號3
DOIs
出版狀態Published - 2010 五月 1

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • 電腦科學(全部)
  • 建模與模擬
  • 管理科學與經營研究
  • 資訊系統與管理

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