Strategic Resources for Drug Trafficking Organizations and the Geography of Violence: Evidence from Mexico

This article helps understand why locations close to strategic infrastructure to transport illegal drugs (seaports, airports, highways, and US ports of entry along the Mexico-US border) or to increase income (pipelines) experience different levels of violence due to DTOs operations. Our theory breaks down the impact of the geographical distance to these facilities on violence into two effects. The first effect is produced by the level of (violent) competition among DTOs, measured by the number of DTOs employing violence. We report that greater proximity to the U.S. ports of entry along the Mexico-US border, ports, and airports furthers the number of competitors, and such increase boosts violence. The second effect shapes the intensity of competition among DTOs. Reductions in the costs of excluding competing DTOs from using the facility could trigger greater confrontation among DTOs. We confirm the importance of this second effect in relation to ports and the U.S. ports of entry along the Mexico-US border.